Hollow Government: Resource Constraints and Workload Expansion at the Food and Drug Administration [redacted version] by McGlinch, Peg
 
Hollow Government: Resource Constraints and Workload
Expansion at the Food and Drug Administration [redacted version]
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Hollow Government: Resource Constraints and Workload
Expansion at the Food and Drug Administration [redacted version]
(2001 Third Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:45:25 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8944673
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAMicrosoft Word 10.0.6612;
Hollow Government:
Resource Constraints and Workload Expansion at the
Food and Drug Administration
[redacted version]
Peg McGlinch
Food and Drug Law
Professor Peter Barton Hutt
April 30, 2001
Harvard Law School
Hollow Government:
Resource Constraints and Workload Expansion at FDA
I. Introduction
It may be true that the “era of big government is over,”1 but new problems have replaced big government in
its wake. The size of government agencies’ staﬀs and budgets have shrunk to respond to public perceptions
of waste and bloat, but the public continues to expect a high level of services from the government. It seems
that Americans expect more from government than they have invested in it.2 As Rudolph G. Penner, a
former director of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, trenchantly asked, “The question is, are taxpayers able
1President William Jeﬀerson Clinton, 1996 State of the Union Address. Archived at Public Papers of the Presidents, William
J. Clinton—1996, vol. 1, at 79.
2Mark L. Goldsten. America’s Hollow Government: How Washington Has Failed the People. Business One Irwin: Home-
wood, IL, 1992, at iix.
1to reconcile what they have come to expect from government during the past 50 years with any willingness
to pay for it?”3
As agencies’ responsibilities have expanded and their resources have remained stagnant, they have been forced
to limit—and in some cases even ignore—actions they are legally bound to carry out.4 Public administrators,
Washington observers, and political scientists have dubbed this new syndrome “hollow government.”5 Today,
the symptoms of hollow government are widespread in federal agencies, particularly those with regulatory
responsibilities such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Indeed, FDA provides an instructive case study of hollow government.6 FDA regulates products that account
for 25 percent of the consumer dollars spent in the United States, and it oversees almost a third of the products
in US markets.7 Furthermore, the markets FDA regulates have exploded in size and complexity over the
past twenty years. For example, the number of FDA-regulated shipments of imports entering the United
States increased more than six-fold, from less than 1 million in 1979 to nearly 6 million today. Since 1990,
public and private sector drug research expenditures have grown seven-fold, from less than $5 billion to $35
billion, leading to a 54 percent hike in annual new drug approvals during the 1990s.8 See Figure 1.
[ﬁgure redacted]
3Mark L. Goldstein. “Hollow Government,” 21 Government Executive 10, October 1988, at 13.
4Mark L. Goldstein. America’s Hollow Government: How Washington Has Failed the People. Business One Irwin: Home-
wood, IL, 1992, at iix.
5See, for example: David Broder, “Hollow Government and Lost Revenue, Washington Post, February 18, 1990, at B7;
Timothy B. Clarke, “Editor’s Notebook,” Government Executive, May 1999, at 4; and Mark Goldstein, America’s Hollow
Government (Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin, 1992).
6See United States Senate Committee on Government Aﬀairs hearing, “Hollow Government: the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration,” One Hundred Second Congress, ﬁrst session, July 25, 1991.
7Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1999. CQ’s Federal Regulatory Directory, 9th ed., Congressional Quarterly: Washington,
D.C., at 214.
8Food and Drug Administration FY 2001 Performance Plan. Accessible at: http://www.fda.gov/ope/fy01plan/parts01.html.
2From 1979 to 1999, medical device technology developed from x-ray machines and CAT scans into robotic
surgery, implantable health monitoring devices, and biomaterials. Food standards in 1979 were based on a
chemical understanding of the ingredients and additives; now FDA must learn how to regulate genetically-
modiﬁed foods. Drug discovery in 1979 consisted primarily of chemical and pharmacological understanding
of the ingredients; today, technology is at the threshold of microchip screening, and the discovery of drugs
is increasingly driven by understanding of the human genome.9
Congress has added to the fray, passing dozens of new laws expanding FDA’s reach and responsibilities
during that period. Among the new laws was, for example, the Infant Formula Act, passed in 1980, which
required FDA to set standards for the content and processing of infant formulas.10 Another law, the Orphan
Drug Act of 1983, established a new program within FDA to foster the development of drugs for rare medical
conditions.11 Later that year, President Reagan enacted the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, which gave FDA
authority to investigate tampering incidents related to products the agency regulates.12 The Prescription
Drug Marketing Act of 1987 charged FDA with restricting the distribution of drug samples, supervising a ban
on speciﬁc resales of drugs, and policing drug wholesalers.13 The AIDS Amendments of 1988 required FDA
to establish and maintain a registry of experimental AIDS drugs.14 The Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act ordered FDA to test claims such as “low-fat” or “natural” before a manufacturer could use those terms
on food labels, and it gave FDA the responsibility to ensure that packaged foods carry nutrition labels.15
This sample merely hints at the range of new laws imposing new duties on FDA each year.
Despite its burgeoning workload, however, since 1979 the number of full time equivalent employees (FTEs)
9Food and Drug Administration FY 2001 Performance Plan. Accessible at: http://www.fda.gov/ope/fy01plan/parts01.html.
1094 Stat. 1190, 21 U.S.C. 301 note.
1196 Stat. 2049, 21 U.S.C. 1365 note.
1297 Stat. 831, 18 U.S.C. 1265 note.
13102 Stat. 95, 21 U.S.C. 301 note.
14102 Stat. 3062, 42 U.S.C. 201 note.
15104 Stat. 2353, 21 U.S.C. 301 note.
3at FDA grew less than 9 percent, from 8,179 16 to 8,910.17 See Figure 2. In the past twenty years, FDA’s
budget increased by approximately 50 percent in constant dollars, from $320 million18 ($647 million in 1999
dollars 19) to $981 million in ﬁscal year (FY) 1999.20 While this represents a greater increase than most
federal agencies received during the same period, it is still manifestly insuﬃcient to accommodate the growth
of the responsibilities that have been entrusted with the agency.
[ﬁgure redacted]
This paper will examine the phenomenon of hollow government at the Food and Drug Administration
during the 1990s. First, it will develop the concept of hollow government, describing its causes and eﬀects
and providing examples from other agencies. Next, because it is impossible to grasp the ramiﬁcations of
organizational hollowing at FDA during the 1990s without understanding how the agency fared during the
1980s, the paper will provide the essential context. Then, it will proceed with a general assessment of the
situation of the agency as a whole during the 1990s, followed by an in-depth assessment of changes in the
workload and resources at each of the ﬁve major program Centers located within FDA. Finally, the paper
will interpret the results of the empirical analysis to determine the degree to which FDA has experienced
“hollowing” over the past decade.
16FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 61.
17FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-8. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
18FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. “The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels: Part III 1962 Drug
Amendments.” June 1981. Posted at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/histor1b.html#toc.
19Numbers inﬂated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Inﬂation Calculator, posted at: www.bls.gov.
20Budget of the United States of America, Analytical Perspectives, 2000, at 529. Posted at:
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/pdf/spec.pdf
4II. Hollow Government
In the 1970s, Army Chief of Staﬀ Edward C. Meyer coined the phrase the “hollow Army” to describe how
insuﬃcient funding and poor preparedness had aﬀected the nation’s armed forces.21 In 1989, the editors
of Government Executive magazine ﬁrst used the term “hollow government,” appropriating the concept
to illustrate the organizational decay that had seeped through much of the federal government during the
Reagan era.22
Today, the term is understood to describe an agency that does not have suﬃcient resources to eﬃciently
and eﬀectively perform the tasks citizens expect of it.23 Note that “hollow government” is not the same
as small government. An agency can be very lean but not hollow if its mission is limited and its resources
are suﬃcient for the job. Similarly, an agency with an enormous staﬀ still might not be able to perform its
work competently if its facilities are inadequate, its operating budget is too thin, if cannot employ enough
specialists to accomplish its objectives, if its computers are obsolete, or for any number of other reasons.
Hollow government, in essence, is a mismatch of responsibilities and resources.
Hollow government can arise for a number of reasons which can occur singly or in combination. Sometimes
it occurs because deep budget cuts or downsizing leave too little money or too few people to do the work of
the agency. Sometimes new laws pile new responsibilities on the agency without any commensurate increase
in funding or FTEs. Finally, sometimes there is a surge in the volume of the agency’s workload that the
21Mark L. Goldstein, “Hollow Government,” 21 Government Executive 10, October 1988, at 13.
22Timothy B. Clark. “Editor’s Notebook,” 31 Government Executive 5 (May 1999), at 4.
23Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 1 (July 25, 1991) (statement of Senator John Glenn).
5agency’s budget and staﬃng allowances cannot match.
In agencies organized into subdivisions, hollowness can aﬄict some parts of the organization and not others.
Congress and the administration may pursue their higher priorities by dedicating revenue streams or allo-
cating appropriations for some agency activities and not others, leading to patches of atrophy and patches
of accomplishment.
If government is hollower today than in recent decades, certainly part of the problem can be attributed to
attenuated staﬃng levels. The size of the federal government workforce has decreased for nine of the past
ten years and ﬁfteen of the past twenty years. At the end of FY 1999, the federal government employed
approximately 1.82 million civilian workers—430,000 less than it employed in FY 1990.24 See Figure 3.
From January 1993 to December 2000, the Defense Department workforce dropped 300,000 employees—
over 30 percent of its total workforce. The Department of Energy and the National Aeronautic and Space
Administration both lost a quarter of their staﬀs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development lost
22 percent of its workers, and the Departments of Agriculture and Veterans’ Aﬀairs both shed 15 percent of
their staﬀs.25 FDA’s workforce fell 3 percent over the same period, while the scope of its work exploded.26
[ﬁgure redacted]
Today, there are fewer civilian employees of the federal government than at any point since 1961,27 yet the
population that those employees serve has risen 50 percent, from 180.67 million in 1961 to 272.69 million in
24US Oﬃce of Personnel Management. Trend of Federal Civilian On-Board Employment for Executive Branch (US Postal
Service excluded) Agencies: Employment at end of Fiscal Year, posted at: http:www.opm.gov/feddata/exec99.htm.
25US Oﬃce of Personnel Management. Trend of Federal Civilian On-Board Employment for Executive Branch (US Postal
Service excluded) Agencies: Employment at end of Fiscal Year, posted at: http:www.opm.gov/feddata/exec99.htm.
26Statistic for 1990: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 61; statistic for 1999: FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report:
FY 1999, April 2000, at I-8. Posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
27US Oﬃce of Personnel Management. Trend of Federal Civilian On-Board Employment for Executive Branch (US Postal
Service excluded) Agencies: Employment at end of Fiscal Year, posted at: http:www.opm.gov/feddata/exec99.htm.
61999.28 Moreover, not only has the labor of federal employees stretched to serve more people, it has also
expanded to cover new programs. For example, in 1961, the federal government did little to provide health
care to the elderly or the poor; now it operates the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which serve one in four
Americans.29 In 1961, the federal government did not operate a federal agency designed to protect the quality
of the nation’s environment; now the Environmental Protection Agency regulates manufacturers, utilities,
and other entities to guard against unsafe disposal of hazardous waste, air pollution, water pollution, global
climate change, pesticides in food, and risks from excessively dangerous chemical substances. Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Environmental Protection Agency are just three illustrations of the kinds of major federal
initiatives that have been launched since 1961, yet despite the host of new federal enterprises, the federal
workforce is the same size it was in 1961.30
One open (and probably unanswerable) question is the extent to which technology has increased federal
employees’ productivity. Obviously, the greater the productivity gains, the less likely it is that downsizing the
federal workforce has materially aﬀected agencies’ ability to conduct their business. There can be no doubt
that innovations such as e-mail, fax machines, computerized databases, word processors, improvements in
laboratory research equipment and techniques, and spreadsheets have led to substantial gains in productivity.
What we cannot know is the extent to which these timesaving devices have also increased demand for services
or placed new demands on the time of federal employees. As just one example, although computers have
surely replaced some support staﬀ, the agencies have hired new employees to service and maintain the
computer systems. Whatever the productivity advances have been, it seems unlikely that they could have
absorbed the combined eﬀects of downsizing, population increases, new governmental initiatives, and the
28US Bureau of the Census. “Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999.” Posted at
www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/popclockest.txt. Revised date: June 28, 2000.
29US Department of Health and Human Services. “HHS Agencies.” Posted at www.hhs.gov/agencies.
30US Oﬃce of Personnel Management. Trend of Federal Civilian On-Board Employment for Executive Branch (US Postal
Service excluded) Agencies: Employment at end of Fiscal Year, posted at: http:www.opm.gov/feddata/exec99.htm.
7expansion of agencies’ existing workloads.
III. Other Agencies’ Experiences with Hollow Government
It is diﬃcult to deﬁne the point at which an agency slips from capable to hollow; like obscenity, we know
hollow when we see it. But some clear-cut examples of other agencies’ deterioration from penny-wise into
pound-foolish may illuminate the potential harm that could result from hollowness at the Food and Drug
Administration.
The Department of Health and Human Services. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) cut
its personnel by 22 percent during the 1980s, and the eﬀects reverberated throughout the agency. The
workforce at the Health Care Financing Administration fell 20 percent at the same time that major revisions
in the Medicare and Medicaid systems were implemented.31 By 1996, the HHS Inspector General concluded
that 14 percent of all Medicare beneﬁts paid were improper, which amounted to $23 billion in that year
alone. In 1997, the Inspector General’s report stated,
[F]unding limitations have signiﬁcantly constrained medical review to the extent that cur-
rently only about 3 of every 1000 providers are subject to postpayment medical review
audit.... Due to limited funding, resources devoted to prepayment and postpayment re-
view have not kept pace with the increase in claims or questionable billing practices by
providers.32
31Mark L. Goldstein. America’s Hollow Government: How Washington Has Failed the People. Business One Irwin: Home-
wood, IL, 1992, at 73.
8The Social Security Administration. The Social Security Administration also lost a great deal of personnel
during the Reagan era; FTEs decreased more than 20 percent, from 80,000 to 63,000. As a result, the
agency was forced to assign inexperienced and untrained workers to ﬁeld telephone inquiries. An internal
study discovered that staﬀ who answered questions about Social Security beneﬁts gave the callers a wrong
answer 40 percent of the time (incorrect responses increased to 80 percent for questions regarding SSA’s
Supplementary Security Income). Additional studies proved that tens of thousands of poor blind, disabled,
and aged persons were accidentally deprived of their SSI checks because of staﬀ shortages.33
The United States Coast Guard. In the late 1980s, appropriations for the Coast Guard remained stagnant or
dropped, despite the fact that Coast Guard patrols played an essential role in the Reagan administration’s
widely announced “zero tolerance” policy for drug smuggling. The Coast Guard was forced to reduce its
workforce and contend with a sharply limited budget for fuel, repairs, and spare parts. Ironically, the limited
repair and fuel funds grounded planes and pilots that were supposed to be used in the administration’s war
on drugs, and in 1988 it even forced the Coast Guard to cut boat patrols oﬀ the coast of Florida in half.34
Moreover, by 1989, the Coast Guard had atrophied to personnel levels smaller than at any time since 1972,
and many of the agency’s most valuable services had been cut back. Its navigation assistance was scaled
back dramatically on heavily traﬃcked oil tanker routes, including Prince William Sound, Alaska, where the
Exxon Valdez spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil in 1989.35
The Savings and Loan Scandal. The savings and loan scandal of the 1980s and early 1990s caused the worst
collapse of U.S. ﬁnancial institutions since the Great Depression. Between 1986 and 1995, a total of 1,043
33Walter Williams. “Let’s Stop Strangling the Feds: Underfunding Means Sick Banks, Suspect Food, Filthy Shores.” The
Washington Post, October 14, 1990, at C5.
34Mark L. Goldstein. America’s Hollow Government: How Washington Has Failed the People. Business One Irwin: Home-
wood, IL, 1992, at 72.
35Mark L. Goldstein. America’s Hollow Government: How Washington Has Failed the People. Business One Irwin: Home-
wood, IL, 1992, at 72.
9savings and loans—with assets of $500 billion—failed. The overwhelming number of failures drained the
resources of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and U.S. taxpayers were left bailing out
the insured depositors. By the end of the 1990s, the crisis had cost taxpayers $124 billion.36 Perhaps
even more horrifying than the loss was the fact that it was avoidable, had the government employed more
examiners to monitor the situation. According to banking expert Edward Kane,
As the number and scope of problem (S&L) institutions grew, the size, training and ex-
perience of the ﬁeld examination force became progressively less adequate. This problem
traces [in part to the Oﬃce of Management and Budget’s] unwillingness to pay high enough
salaries or to establish a suﬃciently attractive career ladder for examiners.37
These cases illustrate a disturbing paradox: the same cutbacks that were designed to slash at government
waste have in some instances actually contributed to waste, fraud, and abuse. The public expects competently
staﬀed and equipped government personnel to help stem the tide of drugs into the country. Instead, the
agency with the responsibility to carry out that mission was crippled under a budget so strapped for funds
that its planes sat in their hangers for want of spare parts. The Medicare system projects bankruptcy in the
foreseeable future, but 14 cents of every one of the billions of dollars paid into the system went for improper
services. Thus, one of the collateral eﬀects of the haste to create a smaller government has been, at least in
some sectors, a considerably less eﬃcient and productive government.
IV. Hollow Government at FDA: The 1980s.
36Timothy Curry and Lynn Shibut. “The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences.” FDIC Banking
Review, December 2000, at 33. Posted at: http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2 2.pdf.
10The Food and Drug Administration has experienced its own share of hollowing over the past decade; however,
it is impossible to grasp the import of post-1990 hollowing without also understanding what happened to the
agency over the course of the 1980s. During the Reagan years, FDA fell into total disarray, withstanding a
long period of budget tightening, personnel downsizing, program atrophy, and even scandal.38 In 1989, Dr.
Samuel Thier, President of the Institutes of Medicine, described FDA as “a demoralized group, being asked
to do too much with too few resources.”39 Before examining the nature and eﬀects of post-1990 hollowing,
then, a review of the FDA track record during the 1980s is essential to provide adequate context.
Staﬃng Resources. During the 1980s, FDA staﬀ was stretched to the breaking point. From 1980 to 1989,
Congress passed 24 laws expanding FDA’s jurisdiction. During that time, the agency had to reassign 675
workers to handle the newly-enacted laws and an additional 400 workers to handle its AIDS activities. 40
Furthermore, the agency’s overall workforce fell by 691 workers, from 8,089 to 7,398.41 This suggests that
only 5,623 workers remained to attend to the same responsibilities that had required 8,089 workers ten years
previously. That represents a 30 percent decline in the staﬃng resources FDA could devote to its previous
activities over the same period in which FDA-regulated industries grew by $56 billion in constant dollars.42
In addition to a dearth of career civil servants, the agency suﬀered from a lack of leadership personnel to
steer the organization. From 1984 to 1990, 36 of the top 64 career management positions at FDA were
vacant for stretches ranging from four months to over ﬁve years.43 Thus, at a time when fewer career staﬀ
38William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 566.
39Philip J. Hilts. “Ailing Agency—The FDA and Safety: A Guardian of U.S. Health is Under Stress. The New York Times,
December 4, 1989, at A1.
40Philip J. Hilts. “Ailing Agency—The FDA and Safety: A Guardian of U.S. Health is Under Stress. The New York Times,
December 4, 1989, at A1.
41FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 61.
42Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 1 (July 25, 1991) (opening statement of Senator John Glenn).
43Walter Williams. “Let’s Stop Strangling the Feds: Underfunding Means Sick Banks, Suspect Food, Filthy Shores.” The
11were responsible for handling a much larger workload, very often there was no one at the helm to guide and
oversee their eﬀorts.
Scandal. The lack of oversight clearly came at a cost. In 1989, the FDA was rocked by scandal; oﬃcials in
the generic drug division had accepted payoﬀs from generic drug ﬁrms seeking favorable treatment for their
products. After the investigations, 5 of the 10 top generic drug companies were implicated for corruption,
fraud, or issuing false statements. At the conclusion of the matter, there were 18 criminal guilty pleas,
including the former chief of the agency’s generic drugs division.44
Budget. When controlled for inﬂation, the Food and Drug Administration’s budget stood still during the
1980s. In 1980, the FDA’s budget was $320 million, which is equivalent to $482 million in 1989 dollars.45 At
the decade’s end, the agency’s budget was $492 million. In real dollars, the agency’s budget increased just
two percent over the entire decade, despite the aforementioned $56 billion jump in FDA-regulated industries.
Activities. Unsurprisingly, the shortage of staﬀ and funding coupled with the rise of wholly new challenges
such as the AIDS virus adversely aﬀected the performance of the agency. Enforcement grew notoriously
lax, as the agency depended more and more on voluntary compliance with regulations.46 The number of
enforcement actions fell 50 percent from the end of the Carter administration to the end of the Reagan
administration.47
In addition, FDA’s ﬁeld resources withered signiﬁcantly during the 1980s, which harmed the agency’s ability
to carry out its inspection responsibilities. In 1970, fully half of the agency’s resources supported ﬁeld ac-
Washington Post, October 14, 1990, at C5.
44Karen Heller, David Rotman, Ronald Begley, Lyn Tattum, and Emma Chynoweth. “Pharmaceuticals: Pressure on Prices
and Proﬁts.” 149 Chemical Week 2 (August 7, 1991), at 26.
45FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. “The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels: Part III 1962 Drug
Amendments.” June 1981. Posted at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/histor1b.html#toc. 1980 statistic inﬂated using Bureau
of Labor Statistics Inﬂation Calculator posted at: http://www.bls.gov.
46William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 569.
47William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 570.
12tivities. By the end of the 1980s, only 38 percent of FDA’s resources were devoted to ﬁeld programs.48 And
while the value of FDA-regulated products increased 20 percent in constant dollars during the 1980’s,49 the
number of food and drug inspections declined nearly 40 percent, from 33,000 to just under 22,000.50
FDA also became progressively more and more handicapped at processing the growing number of premarket
applications it was received each year. Industry investments in research skyrocketed, especially in the second
half of the 1980s, when drug research expenditures doubled from $4.1 billion to $8.1 billion and medical
device research increased 164 percent, from $1.4 billion to $3.7 billion. 51
The increased corporate and academic commitment to research translated into a much larger workload for
FDA, but with fewer hands to carry it out. The number of new product applications grew 82 percent from
1980 to 1989, while average approval time reached 32.5 months, compared to the legally required standard
of 6 months.52 Medical device applications rose 185 percent from 1980 to 1989.53 Instead of strengthening
FDA’s ability to process the new applications, however, the agency’s research staﬀ devoted to drugs actually
declined 28 percent, and its medical device staﬀ shrank 20 percent from 1985 to 1989.54
Other important agency activities slipped during the Reagan years. In 1972, FDA had undertaken to review
the claims of over-the-counter (OTC) medications. By the early 1980s, FDA-appointed scientiﬁc panels
determined that two-thirds of all over-the-counter drug ingredients and claims were unsupported by scien-
48“State of the Food and Drug Administration,” speech presented to the DHHS Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug
Administration by James S. Benson (Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs), May 18, 1990.
49Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 75 (July 25, 1991) (statement of Mark Novitch, M.D., Vice Chairman of the Board, The Upjohn
Company).
50Walter Williams. “Let’s Stop Strangling the Feds: Underfunding Means Sick Banks, Suspect Food, Filthy Shores.” The
Washington Post, October 14, 1990, at C5.
51Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 78 (July 25, 1991) (statement of Mark Novitch, M.D., Vice Chairman of the Board, The Upjohn
Company).
52Karen Heller, David Rotman, Ronald Begley, Lyn Tattum, and Emma Chynoweth. “Pharmaceuticals: Pressure on Prices
and Proﬁts.” 149 Chemical Week 2 (August 7, 1991), at 26.
53“State of the Food and Drug Administration,” speech presented to the DHHS Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug
Administration by James S. Benson (Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs), May 18, 1990.
54Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 79 (July 25, 1991) (statement of Mark Novitch, M.D., Vice Chairman of the Board, The Upjohn
Company).
13tiﬁc evidence. Despite this ﬁnding, because of cutbacks during the Reagan administration, the number of
employees reviewing over-the-counter medications fell by almost half. By the end of the decade, the agency
had ﬁnished reviewing just 20 percent of OTC ingredients. As late as 1992, more than half of the OTC
ingredient categories were still awaiting ﬁnal decisions.55
The agency’s rulemaking process nearly ground to a halt in the 1980s. The Medical Device Amendments
were enacted in 1976, and it took FDA eight years to issue the regulations mandated by the law. As of 1992,
the agency had not issued regulations under the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, or the Drug Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.56 In 1991, the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment
asked FDA to produce a list of pending regulations, and its ability to track its own regulations was in such
a state of disorganization that it was unable to do so. When FDA ﬁnally released the list, it revealed that
the agency’s pending regulations had been under consideration for an average of nine years. The regulations
designated as important took an average of ﬁve years to promulgate. Two regulations had been pending for
29 years each.57
Facilities and Equipment. With the increased workload and a shrinking staﬀ, FDA was unable to free enough
resources to support decent investments in facilities and equipment. By 1990, the results were obvious: a
federal advisory committee examining the condition of the Food and Drug Administration variously de-
scribed the administration’s facilities as “obsolete,” “technologically inadequate,” and “abysmal.”58 Of the
nine FDA laboratories, four were rated as “unacceptable,” and at times high heat and humidity would shut
oﬀ sensitive equipment, wrecking scientists’ eﬀorts to test food products.59 Overcrowding became another
55William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 572.
56William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 572.
57William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 572.
58Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 2 (July 25, 1991) (opening statement of Senator John Glenn).
59Walter Williams. “Let’s Stop Strangling the Feds: Underfunding Means Sick Banks, Suspect Food, Filthy Shores.” The
Washington Post, October 14, 1990, at C5.
14serious problem. For example, even senior scientists with the Center for Veterinary Medicine worked in
trailer homes, while the adjacent laboratories were housed in 1930s-era barns.60
Equipment had deteriorated so badly that scientists were spending increasing amounts of time troubleshoot-
ing and ﬁxing equipment instead of actually conducting their research. On some projects, scientists were
forced to customize equipment from available parts in order to accomplish speciﬁc jobs. Other times, the
agency was forced to borrow equipment from industry in order to carry out its work.61
In addition to the obvious productivity impediments that poor facilities and equipment created, they also
harmed the agency’s morale and made it harder for FDA to compete with academia and the private sector
when attempting to attract well-qualiﬁed employees, especially when FDA paid scientists far less than
academia.62
Summary. At the close of the 1980s, it was apparent that FDA faced an organizational crisis. Its staﬀ,
its facilities, its equipment, and its reputation were all in the midst of a downhill slide. The agency’s acting
Commissioner James Benson characterized the agency’s condition as follows:
60“State of the Food and Drug Administration,” speech presented to the DHHS Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug
Administration by James S. Benson (Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs), May 18, 1990.
61“State of the Food and Drug Administration,” speech presented to the DHHS Advisory Committee on the Food and Drug
Administration by James S. Benson (Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs), May 18, 1990.
62Walter Williams. “Let’s Stop Strangling the Feds: Underfunding Means Sick Banks, Suspect Food, Filthy Shores.” The
Washington Post, October 14, 1990, at C5.
15Since 1976, Congress has assigned FDA vast responsibilities under several new laws, requir-
ing major initiatives in areas such as medical devices, generic drugs, drug diversion, orphan
drugs, pesticides, AIDS and anabolic steroids. The cumulative eﬀect has forced FDA to
“withdraw” more assets than it has in its resource bank. In eﬀect, we are “overdrawn” on
virtually all accounts. FDA managers have been forced to cannibalize core functions and
other programs to accommodate these new legislated activities.63
Soon after, a Department of Health and Human Services Advisory Committee echoed Benson’s conclusion,
stating, “It is glaringly apparent that the FDA cannot now execute all of its statutory responsibilities within
the limitations of available resources.”64 In short, at the beginning of the 1990s, FDA was an agency with
virtually no ability to absorb more organizational hits without shattering.
V. Hollow Government at FDA, 1990 to the Present.
FDA oﬃcials opened the decade of the 1990s determined to take stock of the organization’s situation. In
March 1990, U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis W. Sullivan named an advisory committee
to examine FDA’s mission, priorities, structure, budget, and workforce.65
After the commission completed its assessment, the panel’s chairman, Charles C. Edwards, testiﬁed before a
64Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 2 (July 25, 1991) (opening statement of Senator John Glenn).
65Advisory Committee on FDA Final Report, HHS Press Release (May 15, 1991).
16Senate committee that the FDA was “at the breaking point;” further, that “without the fundamental changes
we call for in the report, the risk of impending public health catastrophe will only grow.”66 Upon reviewing
the report, Senator Ted Kennedy, the Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee,
concluded,
The agency is overextended, underfunded and whip-sore by multiple layers of bureaucratic
review and restraint. Each time conﬁdence in the agency is eroded, and FDA staﬀ becomes
demoralized, the nation moves closer to a real possibility of a major health disaster. Will it
be in the food supply, in prescription drugs, in the blood banks? No one can predict. But
what we can say reading this report is that we are living too close to the edge.67
Despite all the concern, throughout the decade, FDA’s resources continued to be stretched beyond all limits.
Staﬃng Resources. Between 1990 and 1999, FDA’s workforce grew from 7,814 to 8,910 FTEs.68 Most of the
growth came in the early 1990s, as the staﬀ grew 8 percent in 1991 and 6 percent in 1992. For much of the
rest of the decade, personnel levels stagnated.69 See Figure 4.
The allocation of employees within FDA also remained relatively ﬁxed during the 1990s, suggesting that
the agency’s relative priorities did not shift signiﬁcantly over the past ten years. For example, in 1992, the
Center for Devices and Radiological Health constituted 10.9 percent of FDA’s workforce; now it comprises
11.1 percent of the agency’s workforce. Similarly, the Center for Veterinary Medicine was 3.2 percent of the
agency’s overall staﬀ in Fiscal Year 1992 and 3.3 percent in Fiscal Year 2001.70
66Karen Heller, David Rotman, Ronald Begley, Lyn Tattum, and Emma Chynoweth. “Pharmaceuticals: Pressure on Prices
and Proﬁts.” 149 Chemical Week 2 (August 7, 1991), at 26.
681990 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac at 63. 1999 statistic: 2001 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level.
691990-1993 statistics: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac at 63. 1994 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1995 Almanac at 19. 1995
statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1996 Almanac at 17. 1996 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1997 Almanac at 10. 1997 statistic: 1999
FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level. 1998 statistic: 2000 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level. 1999
statistic: 2001 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level.
701990-1993 statistics: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac at 61. 1994 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1995 Almanac at 19. 1995
statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1996 Almanac at 17. 1996 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1997 Almanac at 10. 1997 statistic: 1999
FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level. 1998 statistic: 2000 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level. 1999
17[ﬁgure redacted]
The two notable changes that did occur took place in the areas of ﬁeld resources and human drugs. The
proportion of ﬁeld staﬀ dropped 3 percent over the course of the decade, and the proportion of Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research employees grew 4.5 percent. Today, the agency’s largest components are
its ﬁeld arm (the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs) at 35 percent of the total staﬀ, and the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research at 21 percent.71 See Figure 5.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Budget. When attempting to quantify FDA’s workload and resources, no measure is more diﬃcult to pin
down than the agency’s budget. Especially after the introduction of industry-paid user fees, FDA’s budget
can be calculated in a seemingly endless variety of ways. For instance, some descriptions of the budget classify
the various forms of expenditures into salaries and expenses (S&E), S&E plus rent and rent-related activities,
or S&E, rents, and buildings and facilities (which is also known as the total program level). Alternatively,
some accounts focus on user fees, classifying the budget in terms of budget authority (the amount of funds
that Congress and the President make available to the agency) and total program level (the budget authority
plus user fees). The budget also often includes classiﬁcation for non-contingent and contingent funding, which
tags the agency’s resource level to the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a particular event, such as adoption
of a new user fee.
statistic: 2001 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level.
711990-1993 statistics: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac at 61. 1994 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1995 Almanac at 19. 1995
statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1996 Almanac at 17. 1996 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1997 Almanac at 10. 1997 statistic: 1999
FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level. 1998 statistic: 2000 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level. 1999
statistic: 2001 FDA All Purpose Table—Total Program Level.
18Another potential source of variation rests in the distinctions between budget authority, budget obligation,
and budget outlays. As mentioned above, budget authority is the legal basis upon which agencies are allowed
to commit funds to its activities. Budget obligations occur when the agency commits money to a certain
purpose. The monies which the agency actually spends are called budget outlays. None of the three measures
are exactly equal in most years. For instance, if an agency orders equipment in one year and pays for it in
the next year, it has transformed congressional budget authority into a budget obligation in the ﬁrst year,
but it does not create an outlay until the following year when it actually transfers the money to the vendor.72
Furthermore, user fees are estimated during the budget planning process, so if demand for the applicable
services is not exactly what the agency forecast, its revenues from user fees will vary from FDA’s budget
estimates. In addition, in many years, the originally-adopted budget must undergo a rescission process
because the government has appropriated too much money.
In short, especially after the establishment of user fees, FDA budgets are moving targets that can be deﬁned
in dozens of ways, and which are revised for years following the actual expenditures. To illustrate the
complexity of tracking the agency’s budget, Figure 6 surveys seven documents that deﬁne FDA’s FY 1995
budget and shows the wide range of results, even among numbers that ostensibly measure the budget in the
same way. For example, the FY 1995 “Annual Budget for S&E with User Fees” was listed as $893 million in
a 1997 FDA document and $904 million in a 1995 document. FY 1995 “Total Program Level” was assessed
at $904 million in a 1995 FDA document, while FY 1995 “Program Level Total” was calculated at $948
million in a 1996 FDA document. Thus, while comparisons across years are unavoidable in this paper, it
should be understood that the budget ﬁgures used are more fraught with uncertainty than other quantiﬁable
measures of the agency’s resources and output.
72Congressional Research Service, “A Brief Introduction to the Federal Budget Process,” Congressional Research Service
Report to Congress (October 20, 1997) 96-912 GOV, posted at: http://www.cnie.org/nle/info-6.html.
19Figure 6.
Various Measures of FDA’s FY 1995 Budget
Budget
Measurement
FY95
Budget
(in
millions)
Source
Actual
S&E
$818 The
Bud-
get
of
the
United
States
Gov-
ern-
ment
Fis-
cal
Year
1997:
Ap-
pendix
at
471.
Annual Budget for
S&E without User
Fees
$818 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1995 at 16,
FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1996 at 16,
FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1997 at 9.
20Actual
Net
Out-
lays
$860 The
Bud-
get
of
the
United
States
Gov-
ern-
ment
Fis-
cal
Year
1997:
Ap-
pendix
at
471.
Actual BA $869 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1996 at 15.
Net BA $882 The Budget of the United States
Government Fiscal Year 1997:
Appendix at 471
Annual Budget for
S&E with User Fees
$892 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1996 at 16.
Total Activity $892 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1996 at 15.
Annual Budget for
S&E with User Fees
$893 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1997 at 9.
Annual Budget for
S&E with User Fees
$904 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1995 at 16.
Total Program Level $904 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1995 at 16.
Program Level Total $948 FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1996 at 15.
Total Obligations $961 The Budget of the United States
Government Fiscal Year 1997:
Appendix at 471.
Gross BA $973 The Budget of the United States
Government Fiscal Year 1997:
Appendix at 471.
Figure 7 shows the range of divergence among ten diﬀerent budget measurements. This paper will use
Salaries and Expenses with User Fees as its yardstick for comparison over the years. Salaries comprise over
2160 percent of FDA’s annual budget, 73 and S&E factors out capital expenses, which can ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly
without greatly aﬀecting the agency’s output.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Despite explosive growth in the industries which FDA is expected to police, the agency’s budget has seen only
modest increases in the past decade and is still miniscule in comparison to the regulated industries. In fact,
as of 1995, the entire FDA budget was roughly one-half of one percent of R&D spending on FDA-regulated
products.74
[ﬁgure redacted]
After accounting for inﬂation, FDA’s S&E budget has increased just 28 percent since FY 1990, from $565
million75 (which equals $744 million in 2000 dollars76) to $950 in FY 2000.77 See Figure 8. The growth
slowed as the decade wore on; from 1995 to the present, salaries and expenses rose only 16 percent in real
dollars78 and 2.8 percent in constant dollars.79
This leads to an unavoidable collision between the expectations of FDA and its ability to respond within
73FDA Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Budget Request at 158, posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/part2.pdf.
74FDA Fiscal Year 1995 Almanac, at 16.
75FDA 1999 Congressional Budget Request, posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget99cj.htm
76Statistic inﬂated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Inﬂation Calculator posted at: www.bls.gov.
77Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2002, at 436. Posted at:
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/pdf/hhs.pdf. http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf.
781995 statistic: The Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1997: Appendix at 471. 2000 statistic: Budget of
the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2002, at 436. Posted at: http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/pdf/hhs.pdf.
79Statistic inﬂated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Inﬂation Calculator posted at: www.bls.gov.
22budgetary constraints. When FDA attempts to manage a workload which has expanded immensely since
1995 on a budget that has increased less than 3 percent, either the quantity or the quality of its monitoring
will have to be reduced correspondingly (unless there were signiﬁcant ineﬃciencies in the agency that could
be corrected quickly, which is highly unlikely). Thus, hollow government is created or exacerbated if it
already existed.
Activities. The modest increases in FDA’s budget may appear generous compared to the funding cuts
and reductions-in-force that many other agencies experienced during the 1990s. But the slight gains that
FDA made did not come close to matching the skyrocketing growth in the industries FDA is required to
regulate. Today, those industries add $2 billion to their domestic research and development (R&D) budgets
every year. In 1998, drug companies spent $20 billion per year on R&D, which is triple the amount of
expenditures from just ten years previously. Furthermore, research budgets at government entities such as
the National Institutes of Health are on the rise.80 The results of the heightened commitment to R&D have
been impressive from a scientiﬁc standpoint but have also increased the burdens on FDA. For example:
• Investigational new drug applications for biologics rose from 379 in FY
1990 to 674 in FY 2000—a 78 percent increase.81
• The number of New Drug Applications approved by the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research increased 42 percent between FY 1990 and FY 2000, from
69 to 98.82
• Between FY 1990 and FY 2000, the number of abbreviated new drug approvals rose
217 percent, from 73 to 232.83
• New Animal Drug Applications rose 43 percent from FY 1990 to FY 2000, from 898 to
1286.84
• The number of FDA-regulated advertisements for prescription drugs rose over 400 per-
cent from 1993 to 2000.85
As FDA’s resources stretch thinner and thinner, some of its basic responsibilities have been neglected. For
example, the agency’s ﬁeld work has dwindled signiﬁcantly over the past decade. Today, 1,100 inspectors and
investigators in the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs are responsible for covering almost 95,000 FDA-regulated
80FDA Plan for Statutory Compliance, 64 Fed. Reg. 65,005 (1998).
23businesses.86 The number of enforcement actions, which is tied directly to the agency’s inspection activities,
has dropped precipitously over the past decade. In 1991, for example, the agency carried out 168 seizures;
in 2000, it ordered only 25—a drop of 85 percent.87 The number of injunctions demanded by the agency fell
by more than half, from 21 in 1991 to 8 in 1999. 88 See Figure 9.
[ﬁgure redacted]
The number of regulatory warning letters and recalls increased markedly during the same period. See Figure
10. This can also be understood as a symptom of an overwhelmed inspection operation. Recalls typically
occur when a contaminated or dangerous product has already reached store shelves. Inspections are supposed
to prevent contaminated materials from reaching the shelves in the ﬁrst place. Thus, the 30 percent surge
in recalls over the past ten years may be partially attributable to FDA’s diminishing ability to deter food
safety violations or spot them before they are unleashed on the public.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Summary. There is growing evidence that the Food and Drug Administration is in severe organizational
distress; its resources are not keeping pace with its workload. Staﬀ members assigned to review premarket
86FDA Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1998, July 1999, at 4. Posted at: www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/98report.pdf.
871991 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 23. 1999 statistic: FDA, “FDA Takes Action to Enforce the Law,” FDA
Consumer (May/June 2000). Posted at: www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/300 law.html.
881991 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 23. 1999 statistic: FDA, “FDA Takes Action to Enforce the Law,” FDA
Consumer (May/June 2000). Posted at: www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2000/300 law.html.
24applications are under tremendous pressure to approve drugs easily and quickly.89 Inspections and enforce-
ment actions are lagging. This means that, at the same time the agency is becoming less rigorous about the
products it allows into enter the marketplace, the products that are actually in the marketplace are being
monitored less diligently.
Instead of giving FDA the resources to do the work that the American public expects it to do or, alternatively,
making explicit choices about how to pare back the expectations of the agency, Congress and the President
have allowed the agency to hollow out, spreading its resources like an ever-thinner veneer across the vast
expanse of territory under its charge.
In 1990, Acting FDA Commissioner James Benson reﬂected on the situation of the agency and observed,
[U]ncontrolled and unrealistic expectations place a heavy burden on the timeliness, eﬃciency,
quality and thoroughness with which we do our job. The plain truth is that over the last 15
years, FDA has been overwhelmed with new organizational and statutory responsibilities....
Rather than indexing resource levels to our program responsibilities and following the “pay
as you go” principle, policy-makers have forced FDA to absorb costly new programs without
commensurate resource increases to implement them.90
VI. Biologics
FDA’s jurisdiction consists of ﬁve major areas: biologics, food, animal feed and drugs, medical devices
and radiological health, and human drugs. Each of these areas is supported by a headquarters operation
where premarket testing and research take place, and ﬁeld oﬃces throughout the country which serve under
89See, for example, David Willman, “How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly Drugs.” Los Angeles Times (December
20, 2000), at A1.
25the agency’s Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs. The agency also supports several smaller programs, such as the
National Center for Toxicological Research, the Oﬃce of Tobacco, and the Oﬃce of the Commissioner, but
this paper will proceed with a closer examination only of hollowing symptoms within the FDA’s main centers.
The Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research is charged with overseeing
the safety, eﬀectiveness, and timely delivery of biological products, such as blood, tissue, allergenics, vaccines,
and biological therapeutics.91 This is a rapidly developing ﬁeld of medicine, and CBER’s jurisdiction has
expanded over the past several years to include such responsibilities as banked human tissues, somatic cell
therapy, gene therapy, and research on bioterrorism.92 A growing share of CBER’s work is in cooperation
with the biotech industry, which today encompasses approximately 1,300 small- and middle-sized biotech
ﬁrms employing about 100,000 skilled workers. The industry devotes $8 billion on research and development
each year, which has fed a signiﬁcant growth in the demand for FDA review of new products.
Activities. Before a biologic product can be marketed in the United States, CBER must license both the prod-
uct and the establishment that intends to manufacture it. The main categories of premarket applications for
biologics are Investigational New Drug Applications (INDs), Investigational New Drug Exemptions (IDEs),
standard original New Drug Applications, Product License Applications, and Biologic License Applications.
93
INDs and IDEs are requests for FDA’s permission to administer a product to a patient prior to clinical trials.
91Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research. “About Us,” posted at: www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm.
92Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research. “Frequently Asked Questions,” posted at: www.fda.gov/cber/faq.htm.
93FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-27. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
26From FY 1990 to FY 2000, total INDs and IDEs have increased 190 percent, from 379 to 722.94 Similarly,
since 1990, the number of IND amendments (which are requests to alter the terms of an existing license) rose
150 percent, and the number of active INDs climbed 170 percent. 95 See Figure 11. The biotech industry is
responsible for a great deal of the growth in demand for CBER’s premarket reviews: the number of biotech
INDs increased from 5 in FY1980 to 327 in FY1998 to 429 in FY1999 (which represents a 30 percent increase
from 1998 to 1999 alone).96
[ﬁgure redacted]
Other indexes of CBER’s activities also demonstrate striking growth. The average number of applications
for biological products licensing has risen dramatically since the beginning of the decade, from an average
of 54 per year during 1990-1992 to 75 per year from 1998-2000 (see Figures 12 and 13).97 The number of
supplements to biological product applications has increased 270 percent from 1990 to 2000. 98
[ﬁgure redacted]
[ﬁgure redacted]
941990 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 37. 2000 statistic: Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “Report
to the Biologics Community,” at 30. Posted at: www.fda.gov/cber/inside/biolrpt.pdf.
951990 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 37. 2000 statistic: Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “Report
to the Biologics Community,” at 30. Posted at: www.fda.gov/cber/inside/biolrpt.pdf.
96FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-27. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
971990 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 37. 2000 statistic: Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “Report
to the Biologics Community,” at 30. Posted at: www.fda.gov/cber/inside/biolrpt.pdf.
981990 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 37. 2000 statistic: Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, “Report
to the Biologics Community,” at 30. Posted at: www.fda.gov/cber/inside/biolrpt.pdf.
27CBER is also responsible for policing the content of biologics advertisement, and the volume of its reviews
grew nearly 300 percent in just six years, from 1995 to 2000. See Figure 14.
[ﬁgure redacted]
As other demands on the agency’s time and resources have increased, CBER’s research activities have been
substantially curtailed over the past several years. Historically, CBER has spent more money than the other
centers at FDA on original research beyond its core activities, such as reviewing and licensing biological
products. But in 1997, the pharmaceutical companies paying user fees persuaded Congress to prohibit the
expenditure of those fees for research.99 Consequently, CBER’s laboratory budget and its research budget
both dropped by half in just four years, from 1994 to 1998.100 See Figure 15.
The Center’s move away from conducting original research was sharply criticized by a 27-member panel of
outside experts who conducted an extensive review of science at FDA. In the words of the group’s report,
the committee’s activities extended beyond its assigned task in order to “address the committee’s unanimous
concern that inadequate funding... for laboratory research within CBER would risk potential damage not
only the health of the population of the United States but also the health of our economy.101 Nonetheless, the
Center’s growing responsibilities together and the user fee prohibition together have dramatically reduced
the Center’s once highly esteemed research enterprise.
99Eliot Marshall, “Panel Issues Plea to Boost FDA Research.” 280 Science 5368 (May 29, 1998), at 1341.
100Stakeholder slides from CBER presentation.
101Quoted in Eliot Marshall, “Panel Issues Plea to Boost FDA Research.” 280 Science 5368 (May 29, 1998), at 1341.
28[ﬁgure redacted]
Staﬃng. Meanwhile, as program activity continued on the upswing and research was waning, the agency
staﬀ devoted to biologics actually decreased over the past four years. FDA’s biologics staﬀ is composed of
two diﬀerent arms: its headquarters staﬀ at the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research and the ﬁeld
staﬀ devoted to biologics within the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs. Together, the two groups of employees form
what is known as the Program Level workforce. Last year, CBER employed 780 FTEs at its headquarters,
and another 211 FTEs employed by the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs handled CBER’s ﬁeld activities, for a
total program level staﬀ of 991.102 This represents a program level decline of about 80 FTEs since 1997,
and the reduction came exclusively from the headquarters operation. The Center’s staﬀ declined about 4
percent per year from 1997 to 1999 and is now smaller than at any time since 1993.103 See Figure 16.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Biologics positions are funded in one of two ways. Some FTEs are supported through the Salaries and
Expenses portion of the program’s federal budget authority. Others are funded through industry user fees.
Beginning in the early 1990s, FDA-regulated industries have paid user fees which the agency has used
to bolster the staﬀ available to conduct regulatory reviews. As the number of PDUFA-funded FTEs has
increased, however, the number of FTEs supported by normal budget authority has declined, eroding 40 to
50 of the 200 or so new positions backed by industry dollars. See Figure 15. In short, the evidence suggests
that, although the expectations of CBER and the biologics ﬁeld operation have increased substantially in
102Food and Drug Administration Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Request, April 2001, at 85. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
103FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-25. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
29the past decade, there has been no commensurate increase in the number of employees charged with meeting
those expectations.
Budget. Last year, the budget of the Center and its aﬃliated ﬁeld eﬀorts was $141 million, which represented
just an 8 percent increase over the past ﬁve years, without accounting for inﬂation.104 Taking inﬂation into
account, the budget actually fell four percent.105 For the past four years, budget authority has accounted
for between 75 and 78 percent of the of the total funding for biologics, while industry user fees contribute
the balance of program level funding.106 See Figure 17.
As the previous section detailed, the workload of the agency has grown in volume and complexity in recent
years, while the budget has remained stagnant. Thus, the agency is now required to attempt more work using
less money and fewer FTEs. Unless the agency discovered a way to increase productivity signiﬁcantly (and
instantly), it seems highly unlikely that the agency could be performing at the same standards of quality
that it did while better funded and staﬀed.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Summary. The evidence could hardly be clearer that the workload of CBER and the biologics ﬁeld staﬀ is
increasing faster than the budget and staﬀ can accommodate. FDA’s biologics program is entrusted with
1041995 statistic: FDA Almanac, FY 1996 at 15. 2000 statistic: FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request All Purpose
Table—Total Program Level. Posted at: www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf.
1051995 statistic inﬂated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Inﬂation Calculator, posted at: www.bls.gov.
1061997 statistic: FDA FY 2000 Congressional Budget Request User Fee History. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/net171.htm.
1998 statistic: FDA FY 2000 Congressional Budget Request All Purpose Table—Total Budget Authority. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/netapt26.htm.
1999 statistic: FDA FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request All Purpose Table—Total Budget Authority. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2001/tables/APTcharts4net.htm.
2000 statistic: FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request All Purpose Table—Total Budget Authority. Posted at:
www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/CurrentLawBA.PDF.
30responsibilities as grave as ensuring the safety of the nation’s blood supply, the vaccines we administer to
children, and new gene therapies. All of these treatments can be lifesaving if properly utilized but carry a
risk of death if mishandled. FDA has been forced to stretch this important program to the breaking point,
utilizing less scientists, fewer inspections, stagnant budgets, and less research to police an exploding array
of biological products and establishments, inviting a public health catastrophe.
VII. Food and Cosmetics.
The jurisdiction of FDA’s food and cosmetics program is enormous and growing faster than the agency can
keep up. As noted above, U.S. residents spend 25 cents of every consumer dollar on products which the Food
and Drug Administration regulates, and three-quarters of this amount is spent on food.107 Together, the
FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition and the associated ﬁeld staﬀ in the Oﬃce of Regulatory
Aﬀairs monitor foods with an annual retail value of $430 billion108 and cosmetics with an annual retail value
of $15 billion.109
The food and cosmetics program supports a number of endeavors ranging from research and premarket
reviews to postmarket surveillance. US food processors spend $1.4 billion on R&D each year, creating
between 10,000 and 15,000 new products. 110 Some of those products utilize new food additives, which
require premarket approval. Its inspection and investigation eﬀorts are even more daunting: the program is
107US FDA, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. “Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Overview.” Posted
at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/cfsan4.html.
108FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-12. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
109US FDA, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. “Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Overview.” Posted
at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/cfsan4.html.
110FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-12. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
31responsible for monitoring 57,000 food establishments111 and 3,500 cosmetic companies,112 and it supplies
states and localities with model codes, technical assistance, and other guidance to assist their regulation of
another 600,000 restaurants and 235,000 supermarkets across the country.113
Premarket Applications. In the mid-1990s, the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition undertook a
variety of measures to improve the quality and speed of its various petition review processes. It devoted
more resources to its computer systems, expanding its capacity for processing electronic information. It also
reassigned scientists from other program areas within FDA to study food applications. Finally, the Center
greatly enhanced the guidance services it provides to applicants, which has led to better submissions to the
agency.114
According to FDA, the new procedures helped them speed reviews and ease the backlog of petition appli-
cations. In mid-1995, 295 petitions, including food and color additive petitions, “Generally-Recognized-As-
Safe” (GRAS) petitions, and citizen petitions, awaited review. Just a year and a half later, at the end of
1996, the Center had received 82 more petitions, but the backlog was cut to 235 petitions.115 Between 1993
and 1997, the median time elapsing between the Center’s receipt of an application and a ﬁnal decision fell
from 37 months to 27 months.116
111Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
112US FDA, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. “Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Overview.” Posted
at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/cfsan4.html.
113US FDA, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. “Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Overview.” Posted
at: http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/cfsan4.html.
114Hearing Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 105th Cong. (March 19, 1997)
(statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration). Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/ola/1997/319.html.
115Hearing Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 105th Cong. (March 19, 1997)
(statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration). Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/ola/1997/319.html.
116Hearing Before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 105th Cong. (March 19, 1997)
(statement of Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Food and Drug Administration). Posted at:
32A broader examination of the petition data reveals more mixed results. For instance, while it is true that
the agency disposed of dozens of backlogged petitions in 1995 and 1996, the total number of food additive
petitions under review remained essentially unchanged over a longer period of time. Even at the end of 1996,
the backlog had shrunk only 7 percent below 1990 levels and was virtually the same as the totals left at the
end of Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995. Moreover, the slow response was not attributable to a long-term upsurge
in the number of petitions that the Center was receiving: food additive application submissions fell almost
36 percent from 1990 to 1996, yet the accumulation of petitions awaiting review barely receded. In fact, the
number of petitions awaiting action for more than 180 days actually increased 62 percent from 1990 to 1996.
See Figure 18.
[ﬁgure redacted]
In the years since 1996, FDA has ceased publishing in any of its budget or Government Performance and
Review Act reports the number of food additive applications receipts it has received. Instead, the documents
state only the percentages of applications the Center approved within 360 days of receipt and the percentage
of overdue applications under active review. In 1999, the most recent year for which data are available, 54
percent of the petitions were approved on time. Among the current group of overdue applications, only 42
percent are even under active review.117
Field Activities. Perhaps more than in any other area of FDA’s activities, the food program’s ﬁeld operation
reveals symptoms of hollow government. As noted above, FDA’s food program regulates $430 billion in
http://www.fda.gov/ola/1997/319.html.
117Food and Drug Administration FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2001/foods.htm.
33goods,118 4.1 million food imports,119 and 57,000 manufacturing plants.120 Yet the program’s entire nation-
wide ﬁeld staﬀ (including all employees, not just investigators and inspectors) consists of just 1,556 FTEs.121
While the United States Department of Agriculture employs 6,000 inspectors to test meat and poultry,122
FDA retains a staﬀ less than one-tenth that size to test all other foods—despite the fact that the General
Accounting Oﬃce has calculated that 85 percent of all cases of food poisoning come from foods regulated
by FDA, not USDA.123
Because of a shrinking staﬀ, the number of food safety inspections has fallen precipitously, now amounting
to just a third of what it was in the 1980s.124 Today, about 400 FDA inspectors are responsible for policing
57,000 food manufacturing plants around the country; proportionally, that means that there is only one
inspector for every 150 establishments. FDA is under no statutory obligation to visit the plants regularly,
and the inspectors are so overwhelmed with work that each plant is inspected about once every eight years.125
See Figure 19.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Imported foods have become another serious problem for the agency. Over the past decade, the number of
diﬀerent items that grocery stores stock has doubled, with a large share of the increase coming from imported
118FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-12. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
119Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
120FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-12. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
121FDA All Purpose Table–Current Law Program Level 2002, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf.
122United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Human Resources Division: Food Inspec-
tors.” Posted at: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OM/HRD/emply career/ﬁ.htm
123Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
124Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
125Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
34products. In the past four years alone, the number of foreign food items consumed in the United States
rose 50 percent, from 2.7 million items in 1997 to 4.1 million items in 2000. In that time, the total number
of inspectors examining food imports nationwide only increased from 110 to 113, which means that, on a
proportional basis, each inspector is now responsible for covering more than 36,000 imports per year.126 As a
result, FDA’s coverage of imported shipments has plummeted. From 1992 to 1997, the proportion of imports
inspected fell 80 percent, from 8 percent in 1992 to 1.7 percent in 1997.127 Today, FDA inspects fewer than
1 percent of all imported foods.128 Many of the foods come from countries in which food processing and
regulatory systems are not as advanced as those found in the United States, 129 and 40 percent of the
imported foods which FDA actually inspects are rejected because they fail to meet US standards.130
In 1998, the General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) issued a report entitled, “Food Safety: Federal Eﬀort to
Ensure the Safety of Imported Foods Are Inconsistent and Unreliable.” The report detailed FDA’s struggle
to inspect imported foods and found that “the ineﬀectiveness of FDA’s approach is magniﬁed by its inability
to keep pace with rising levels of [food] imports. 131
Proof abounds that the agency is increasingly unable to manage its caseload properly. In FY 2000, the
number of food recalls jumped to 315, which is more than any year since the mid-1980s and 36 percent
higher than the average since the agency began keeping those records 15 years ago. In each case, the recalled
126Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
127From Walter Williams, “When ‘Leaner and Meaner’ Mean Ineﬃcient, Ineﬀective.” The Seattle Times Company, September
25, 1998, at B5.
128Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
129FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-8. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
130Hollow Government: The Food and Drug Administration: Hearing Before the Comm. on Governmental Aﬀairs, United
States Senate, 102d Cong. 1 (July 25, 1991) (statement of Senator John Glenn).
131From Walter Williams, “When ‘Leaner and Meaner’ Mean Ineﬃcient, Ineﬀective.” The Seattle Times Company, September
25, 1998, at B5.
35food had gone onto store shelves before the contamination was detected. 132 Experts are voicing concern at
the increase in recalls. According to George Grob, deputy inspector general of HHS,
Any reasonable person would worry about it. If the inspection process worked really well,
there would be fewer recalls. That’s why you do inspections: to prevent any contamination
from occurring in the ﬁrst place.133
In what is perhaps another symptom of an agency struggling under too many responsibilities, the number
of enforcement actions pursued by the program dropped signiﬁcantly as the decade of the 1990s progressed.
Between FY 1991 and FY 1996, the number of injunctions dropped 80 percent and the number of seizures
fell 65 percent.134 See Figure 20.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Unfortunately, there is also substantial public health evidence that FDA can no longer meet its responsibility
to assure the country of a safe food supply. As the demands on federal food inspection activities have
skyrocketed, so has the incidence of serious gastrointestinal illness, which is a common measure of food
poisoning. Today’s levels of gastrointestinal illness are one-third higher than they were in 1948. According
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), food poisoning causes 5,000 deaths, 325,000
hospitalizations, and 76 million illnesses every year. CDC also notes that food causes twice as many illnesses
in the United States as it was thought to cause 7 years ago.135
Staﬃng. Despite the Clinton administration’s commitment to a new Food Safety Initiative, the explosive
132Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
1341991 data: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 23; 1996 data: FDA Fiscal Year 1997 Almanac, at 23.
135Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
36growth in the foods program’s workload has swallowed up any eﬀects from the modest eﬀorts to shore up
the program’s staﬀ and budget. Over the past three years, CFSAN’s staﬀ has grown 6 percent. Because of
previous agency cutbacks, however, the increases still leave the staﬀ well below 1992 levels. The Center now
conducts all of its activities with a staﬀ of 830—about 125 fewer FTEs than it employed in 1992. In fact,
since 1992, the entire Food and Drug Administration workforce has decreased 2 percent, while CFSAN has
suﬀered cuts over six times as deep, amounting to 13 percent of its workforce. 136 The supporting ﬁeld staﬀ
has increased 7 percent since 1998, yet it is still obviously struggling under a massive inﬂux of new work.137
See Figure 21.
Caroline Smith DeWaal, food safety director at the Center for Science in the Public Interest, summed up
the eﬀects of the overburdened staﬀ: “The FDA is simply going from crisis to crisis and attempting to put
out ﬁres.”138
[ﬁgure redacted]
Budget. For most of the 1990s, the food program’s budget stagnated or decreased. It reached its nadir
of $200 million in 1997, sustaining a 10 percent cut from the preceding year. Since 1997, the budget has
increased by nearly $80 million, but inﬂation has eroded much of the value of the gains. Although the budget
grew from $209 to $280 million between FY 1993 and FY 2000, the increase amounted to 12 percent after
inﬂation.139 Considering the expansion of the program’s responsibilities during that period, it seems evident
1361992 data: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 60; 2000 data: FDA All Purpose Table–Current Law Program Level 2002
Estimate, posted at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf.
137FDA All Purpose Table–Current Law Program Level 2002 Estimate, posted at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf.
138Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
1391993 data: FDA Fiscal Year 1993 Almanac, at 62; 2000 data: FDA All Purpose Table–Current Law Program Level
2002 Estimate, posted at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf. Data inﬂated with Bureau of Labor
37that resources are stretching ever tighter and hollowing eﬀects are increasing. See Figure 22.
[ﬁgure redacted]
FDA’s resources for food safety appear especially small when compared to the sums Congress appropriates
to the USDA for similar purposes. During the 1980s, there was heightened public concern over whether
the government adequately inspected ﬁsh. Congress responded by almost doubling the budget for such
inspections between 1990 and 1992, but even the increased budget provided only $40 million. By comparison,
USDA’s meat program, which was also criticized as underfunded and excessively lax, received $473 million
during the same period.140 In 1998, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, which regulates meat,
poultry, and eggs, received $672 million.141 In that year, FDA, which is charged with regulating all other
foods, conducted its ﬁeld work on a budget of under $119 million.142
Summary. FDA’s food safety program is struggling under the weight of crushing workload expansions, and
its budget and staﬀ resources have failed to keep pace. The activities of this division touch the lives of
most Americans on a daily basis, serving as one of the most important lines of defense protecting the US
from a public health crisis. With its resources spread so thin, however, the preventive functions of the foods
program will erode even more than they already have. In the words of Dickson Despommier, a public health
professor at Columbia University, “We are the canaries in the coal mines. The moment someone gets sick,
we say, ‘Don’t eat that food.’ It’s a miracle that the system doesn’t break down more.”143
Statistics Inﬂation Calculator, posted at: www.bls.gov.
140William B. Schultz. 1992. “The Food and Drug Administration: Food, Drugs, and Medical Devices,” in Changing America:
Blueprints for the New Administration, Mark Green, ed. Newmarket Press, NY, at 571.
141United States Department of Agriculture FY 2000 Budget Summary, posted at:
http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2000/text.html#fs.
142FDA All Purpose Table–Total Program Level, at www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/netapt25.htm.
143Greg Winter, “Contaminated Food Makes Millions Ill Despite Advances,” The New York Times (March 18, 2001), at A1.
38VIII. Animal Drugs and Feed
The Food and Drug Administration’s animal feed and drugs program consists of the Center for Veterinary
Medicine (CVM) and the associated ﬁeld staﬀ from the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs. Together, these two
groups utilize premarket approvals and postmarket surveillance to ensure that animal drugs and medicated
feeds are safe and eﬀective and that the food gleaned from treated animals used as food is safe for human con-
sumption.144 Some of the higher-proﬁle activities of the program today include eﬀorts to prevent outbreaks
of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad cow disease”) in the United States and monitoring the
use of antibiotics in animal feed.
The smallest of FDA’s ﬁve main program centers, the Center for Veterinary Medicine withstood a 33 percent
increase in premarket submissions between FY 1992 and FY 1997 at the same time that its staﬀ shrank
and its budget actually decreased (without even accounting for inﬂation). Sixty percent of the program’s
budget is devoted to salaries,145 and government employees receive mandatory pay increases; thus, for the
same ﬁve years in which the demand on the program’s premarket approval was increasing rapidly, program
managers were increasingly forced to shift operating funds to salary expenditures to cover the cost of living
increases.146 It appears, then, that the animal feed and drug program is experiencing the same types of
hollowing pressures as other FDA program areas.
The Center for Veterinary Medicine. The main functions of the animal program’s research division are to
144FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine, “CVM: Structure and Responsibilities.” Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/structtxt.html.
145FDA’s FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request, “Animal Drugs and Feeds Program.” Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2001/andrugfeeds.htm.
146Dr. Stephen F. Sundlof, Presentation at Center for Veterinary Medicine Stakeholder Meeting, April 28, 1999. Posted at:
www.fda.gov/cvm/fdama/cvmtranscript.htm.
39prevent the marketing of unsafe or ineﬀective animal feeds, feed additives, drugs, and devices and to ensure
the safety of all foods derived from animals who have been treated with any drugs or food additives. To
accomplish this mission, CVM reviews four diﬀerent types of drug applications: New Animal Drug Applica-
tions (NADAs), Abbreviated New Animal Drug Applications (ANADAs), Investigational New Animal Drug
Applications (INADAs), and Generic Investigational New Animal Drug Applications (JINADs).
During the year 2000, CVM received 28 NADAs (plus 1,286 supplements to previously-ﬁled NADAs), 55
ANADAs (plus 195 supplements to previously-ﬁled ANADAs), 3,422 INADs, and 194 JINADs.147 Overall,
this represented an increase over the 1999 CVM workload. See Figure 23.
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148FY 1999 data: FDA’s FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request. Posted at:
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New Animal Drug Applications are designed to treat or prevent disease in animals, or to make the animals
better producers of food. CVM received eleven fewer NADAs in FY 2000 than it had in FY 1999 (see Figure
24), yet the time elapsing between receipt and approval increased from an average of 12 months in 1999 to
14 months in 2000.149 Note from Figure 24, however, that over the course of the 1990s, the Center very
successfully reduced the backlog of applications awaiting action.
[ﬁgure redacted]
On the other hand, the number of application supplements ﬁled with the Center rose sharply from 1999
to 2000. See Figure 25. Supplemental applications are requests to alter the conditions of an existing drug
approval: some are routine (for instance, if a manufacturer merely wants to change a production process),
but other require a great deal of work from the Center (such as approving use of a drug for a new species
or purpose).150 As Figure 25 indicates, the backlog of supplements has grown substantially over the past
several years.
The same can be said for new Investigational New Animal Drug Applications. As Figure 26 demonstrates,
149FY 1999 data: FDA’s FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request. Posted at:
www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2001/andrugfeeds.htm. FY 2000 data: FDA’s FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, at
108-109. Posted at: www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
150FDA’s FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, at 108-109. Posted at: www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
41the number of new INADAs has been falling in recent years, but the backlog has been growing. The
escalating backlogs can certainly be considered a possible symptom of a hollow agency whose responsibilities
are overwhelming it.
[ﬁgure redacted]
[ﬁgure redacted]
In addition to its premarket licensing process, the animal feed and drug program also monitors its regulated
products after they reach the stream of commerce. One way that the program monitors the products
it regulates is through the collection of Adverse Drug Reaction Reports, which detail the circumstances
surrounding problems with the product. From the early to the mid-1990s, the number of Adverse Drug
Reaction Reports skyrocketed over 80 percent. See Figure 27. It is possible to interpret the upsurge in
adverse event reporting in two ways: either the inherent safety of the products slipped, or the incidence of
reporting adverse events occurred. According to Dr. Stephen F. Sundlof, Director of CVM, the situation
was the latter:
[W]e have required a lot more focused reporting in some of the product areas where there
has been a lot of attention. For instance, in the area of bovine somatotropin, we require
quite a lot of reporting back on that product.151
[ﬁgure redacted]
42Staﬃng. As noted previously, the Clinton administration launched a Food Safety Initiative, which has led
to the ﬁrst sizable increase in the budget of the animal feed and drug program in years. But because the
initiative is designed primarily to support grants-based research, the number of full time equivalents has not
increased substantially.152 As Figure 28 demonstrates, the animal program staﬀ dipped and then remained
ﬂat for most of the 1990s. Only in the past year or so has the program begun a tentative upswing.
As part of FDA’s FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, the animal program has requested 105 more FTEs
to help carry out its BSE prevention and inspection activities, although there is no indication yet whether
Congress will heed the request.153
[ﬁgure redacted]
Budget. FDA’s animal feed and drugs program conducts solid work that is vital to the nation’s interests.
Consider, for example, the integral role the program has performed in the prevention of BSE outbreaks in
the United States, and the massive harm that the disease has caused in Europe. Yet every year FDA’s
animal feed and drug program is in the unenviable position of putting forth its budget request to Congress
alongside requests for money to regulate AIDS and cancer drugs, new biotech breakthroughs, human foods,
and other higher-proﬁle endeavors, which often overshadow the importance of CVM’s work.
At a time when budgets have been tight across most of the federal government, and when FDA has actually
managed to buck trends by securing increases (pale though they may be in comparison to the workload
expansions), the animal program appears to have been a ready target for reigning in FDA’s budget. Between
1990 and 1999, while the overall FDA budget increased by over 50 percent, the Center for Veterinary
152FDA Chief Financial Oﬃcer’s Annual Report: FY 1999, April 2000, at I-8. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/accounting/CFO/pdf/99report.pdf.
153FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
43Medicine’s budget actually fell without accounting for inﬂation. See Figure 29.
The program’s budget has increased signiﬁcantly over the past two years due to the President’s Food Safety
Initiative. However, as Figure 29 also shows, in constant dollars, the gains have barely lifted the program
above the levels of the early 1990s.
Summary. The backlog of various applications awaiting action within the Center for Veterinary Medicine
suggest that the agency’s workload is exceeding its capacity. Only time will tell whether the recent increases
in staﬃng and budget will be suﬃcient to stave oﬀ the hollowness that appears to be creeping into the
organization.
[ﬁgure redacted]
IX. Center for Devices and Radiological Health.
FDA’s devices and radiological products program maintains one of the most diverse regulatory portfolios
within the Food and Drug Administration, with jurisdiction over products ranging from tongue depressors
to video display terminals to robotic surgery devices. The program consists of the Center for Devices and
Radiological Health and a supporting ﬁeld operation in the Oﬃce of Regulatory Aﬀairs. Together, the pro-
gram’s two branches are responsible for ensuring that medical devices are safe and eﬀective, and for reducing
unnecessary radiation exposure from medical, workplace, and consumer products.154
Similar to other FDA program areas, the devices/radiological health program carries out its responsibilities
through premarket review and licensing and postmarket surveillance. The Center considers Medical Device
Premarket Approval Applications and Supplements, Medical Device Premarket Notiﬁcations, and Investiga-
154Center for Devices and Radiological Health, “Overview of CDRH.” Posted at: http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/overview.html.
44tional Device Exemption Applications. It also establishes and enforces regulations governing manufacturing
practices and performance standards for the products it regulates. Furthermore, in order to monitor regu-
lated products after they have been approved, the program operates the MedWatch reporting system, which
maintains information about injuries, deaths, and other adverse experiences related to medical devices.
Activities. Over the past ten years, the annual number of applications for new medical devices has varied
wildly. From FY 1990 to FY 1992, there were on average 73 petitions each year. During the next three
years, the number dropped 40 percent, to an average of 40 per year. By the period of FY 1998 to FY 2000,
the average had climbed back up to 64 applications per year. See Figure 30.
The number of application supplements (which are requests to alter the conditions of an existing approval)
followed a similar path, dropping sharply between FY 1990 and FY 1992, and then commencing a steady
four-year climb. In the past several years, though, the number of supplements has actually fallen slightly.
See Figure 31.
[ﬁgure redacted]
[ﬁgure redacted]
Premarket Medical Device Approvals are reserved only for devices involving the highest risk to the patient or
the newest technology. In fact, most devices are cleared for the marketplace through Premarket Notiﬁcation
45Approval, also known as a 510(k) submission.155 Note that the number of 510(k)s is usually almost ten
times higher than the number of PMDAs each year. See Figure 32.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Before the developer of a new medical device can commence a full trial to determine the product’s safety and
eﬀectiveness, the developer must gain the approval of an institutional review board and the informed consent
from the individuals participating in the study. If the study presents a signiﬁcant risk to the patients, the
developer must also secure FDA’s authorization of an Investigational Device Exemption Application (IDE).
The Center has a month from the time of its receipt to decide whether to approve or reject the application.156
Figure 33 tracks the Center’s receipt and reviews of IDEs, which have risen substantially since 1994.
[ﬁgure redacted]
In addition to its premarket review and licensing activities, the device program also engages in a great deal
of postmarket surveillance and ﬁeld inspections. It has established the MedWatch Medical Device Report
eﬀort to monitor adverse events stemming from the use of medical devices. The reporting requirements have
changed slightly over the years, so comparisons across years are not reliable; however, it is very clear that
reviewing all the MedWatch reports requires a substantial commitment of agency resources. In FY 2000,
the device program received reports of almost 92,000 MDR incidents, plus an additional 3,000 voluntary
155Oﬃce of Device Evaluation, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2000. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/annual/fy2000/ode/ode-ar2000.html.
156Oﬃce of Device Evaluation, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2000. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/annual/fy2000/ode/ode-ar2000.html.
46reports.157
Although the most recent ﬁgures are unavailable, Figures 34 and 35 hint at the growth in the number of
medical device and radiological establishments subject to inspections by ORA personnel. Unsurprisingly,
ORA can manage to inspect only a small proportion of the establishments each year. In FY 1998, FY 1999,
and FY 2000, there were 2,002,158 2,813,159 and 1,294160 domestic device/radiological inspections conducted
respectively.
[ﬁgure redacted]
[ﬁgure redacted]
Staﬃng. In 1976, Congress passed the ﬁrst legislation giving FDA jurisdiction to regulate medical devices.
In its Congressional Budget Request, FDA asked for enough funds to hire 1200 additional employees to
accommodate the new workload, but Congress did not appropriate the money.161
Times are somewhat better for the program today. Now, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health and
157FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health,” at 124. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
158FDA FY 2000 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health.” Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/ﬁeldother.htm#devices.
159FDA FY 2001 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health.” Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2001/cdrh.htm.
160FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health,” at 124. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
161Government Executive, Inc. “FDA on the Brink.” Government Executive, August 4, 1997. Posted at
www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0897/080497t3.htm.
47the supporting ORA ﬁeld staﬀ number under 1500.162 Since 1996, the CDRH staﬀ has continued on a slow
but steady decline, from a peak of 1,113163 workers to 988.164 The ﬁeld staﬀ has sustained proportionally
deeper cuts, from nearly 600165 in FY 1997 to just 483 166 in the last ﬁscal year. See Figure 36.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Interpreting the adequacy of the device program’s staﬃng resources is not as clear cut as it is with some of
the agency’s other divisions, however. The indicators above suggest that the demand for CDRH’s premarket
approvals is actually in a moderate decline: premarket approvals, supplements, and notiﬁcations have all
dropped. And while the number of IDEs has increased, the Center seems to be keeping up with the appli-
cations, reviewing as many as it receives. The data regarding the ﬁeld program is incomplete; however, the
number of regulated establishments falling under the program’s purview increased during the mid-1990s,167
while the size of the ﬁeld staﬀ conducting the inspections has shrunk in the years hence.168 This suggests
that the ﬁeld operation may be experiencing some degree of hollowing.
[ﬁgure redacted]
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http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
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http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/netapt25.htm
166FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health,” at 124. Posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
167See FDA FY 1993 Almanac at 22 and FDA Almanac FY 1997 at 56.
168See FDA FY 2000 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health, posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/netapt25.htm and FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and
Radiological Health,” at 124. Posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
48Budget. Ironically, at the same time that the number of premarket submissions to CDRH was declining in
the early- to mid-1990s, its budget was actually rising. The gains were short-lived, though, as the resource
level remained stagnant from FY 1997 to FY 1999.169 In FY 2000, the program received a $10 million boost,
almost all of which was allocated to the Center. Figure 37 illustrates the eﬀects of inﬂation on the program’s
budget over the past decade: the buying power of the FY 2000 budget is actually lower than all but two
other years since 1993.
Summary. If FDA’s medical devices and radiological health program is suﬀering from severe hollowing ten-
dencies, it is not obvious from this data. It is clear that the program’s workforce has decreased and its
budget has remained level or dropped slightly over the past several years. But several of the most impor-
tant measures of the agency’s activity level have revealed a shrinking workload as well, and there do not
seem to be persistent backlogs of petitions awaiting agency action or widespread complaints of inadequate
inspections. There may well be hollowing trends occurring in the device program, but the characteristics of
hollowing are not as obvious nor as prevalent in this program as they are in other divisions within FDA.
X. The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
One of FDA’s most crucial functions is to review all over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription medications
for safety and eﬀectiveness. This task takes two forms: premarket testing to determine whether a drug is
169See FDA FY 2000 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and Radiological Health, posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2000/netapt25.htm and FDA FY 2002 Congressional Budget Request, “Devices and
Radiological Health,” at 124. Posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
49actually ﬁt for marketing in the United States and postmarket monitoring to ensure that the product is
manufactured, packed, and labeled according to federal standards.
Activities. The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research presides over a lengthy and highly complex process
for approving new drugs. On average, it requires 12 years and $500 million to bring a new drug into public
usage.170 When scientists discover new chemical entities having the potential to become drugs, the chemicals
are ﬁrst tested on animals to determine safety and the biological response. If the results suggest that the
entity is safe and eﬀective, a drug company can submit an investigational new drug application to FDA. If
FDA approves the INDA, the company commences a three-phase clinical trial to evaluate safety and eﬃcacy,
while the number of patients using the drug gradually increases. About 70 percent of the drugs undergoing
clinical trials complete Phase I. A third ﬁnish Phase II, while just 27 percent complete Phase III. Only at
the conclusion of Phase III can a company submit a New Drug Application to CDER. 171
Over the past twenty years, the pharmaceutical industry’s spending on drug research and development
increased seven-fold, from $5 billion to $35 billion per year.172 This has translated into a steady inﬂux of
applications for various kinds of approvals at the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, the largest of
FDA’s 5 centers.173 The number of active Investigational New Drug Applications has risen 27 percent since
FY 1990, from 9,506 to 12,030.174 See Figure 38. The number of New Drug Applications grew 54 percent
170Hearing on a Medicare Prescription Drug Beneﬁt, United States Senate Committee on Finance, 106th Cong. (March 22,
2000) (statement of Alan F. Holmer, President and Chief Executive Oﬃcer, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America). Posted at: http://www.senate.gov/∼ﬁnance/3-22phrm.pdf.
171C. Daniel Mullins, Francis Palumbo, and Bruce Stuart. “Projections of Drug Approvals, Patent Expirations, and Generic
Entry from 2000 to 2004.” Report prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services’ Conference on Pharma-
ceutical Pricing Practices, Utilization and Costs (August 8-9, 2000). Posted at: http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/Drug-
papers/Mullins-Palumbo%20paper-ﬁnal.htm.
172Food and Drug Administration FY 2001 Performance Plan. Accessible at: http://www.fda.gov/ope/fy01plan/parts01.html.
173Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “From Test Tube to Patient: Improving Health through Human Drugs.” (1999
version), posted at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-1.pdf.
1741990 statistic: FDA Almanac, Fiscal Year 1993, at 29. 2000 statistic: FDA’s Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Budget
Request, posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
50during the same period, from 69 to 106.175 See Figure 39.
[ﬁgure redacted]
ﬁgure redacted
Each year, as part of its premarket NDA approval process, the Center encounters a number of New Molecular
Entities (NMEs), which are substances that have never been approved in the United States for use in a drug
product either as the only ingredient or as part of a combination of ingredients.176 NMEs require exhaustive
testing, and their numbers are rising rapidly. Figure 39 demonstrates the large increase in the incidence
of NMEs under review at CDER today versus years past. The average annual number of NMEs approved
between 1995 and 2000 is nearly three times higher than it was in the 1960s.177
[ﬁgure redacted]
The generic drugs division has become an area of particular accomplishment for the Center. From 1993 to
2000, the number of generic drug approvals rose 36 percent while the average approval time fell from 40.4
months to 22.3 months.178
1751990 statistic: FDA Almanac, Fiscal Year 1993, at 29. 2000 statistic: FDA’s Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Budget
Request, posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
176FDA’s Quarterly Report, 4th Quarter 1994, at 43.
177Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Improving Public Health Through Prescription Drugs: Center for Drug Evalu-
ation and Research Fiscal Year 1997 Report to the Nation, at 5-6. Posted at: www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rptntn97.pdf.
178FDA’s Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Budget Request at 79, posted at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/LangDevices.pdf.
51[ﬁgure redacted]
FDA’s ﬁeld responsibilities are no less daunting. Currently, over 18,000 establishments in the U.S. manufac-
ture, test, pack, or label human drug products, and FDA’s drug ﬁeld operation is required to inspect each of
the facilities at least once every two years. An additional 1,100 foreign establishments receive intermittent
inspections.179
The drug program’s ﬁeld staﬀ is housed in oﬃces in 172 diﬀerent locations across the country, and it
completed 3,661 inspections in 3,230 domestic establishments in FY 1998. It also conducted 356 inspections
of 323 establishments overseas.180
The ﬁeld staﬀ’s inspections and the CDER’s surveillance of adverse reaction reports provide the basis for
the drug program’s enforcement actions, which include drug recalls and drug withdrawal. As Figure 41
demonstrates, the number of Adverse Reaction Reports to the drug program has risen steadily during the
1990s.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Drug recalls and drug withdrawals are two means of removing unsafe pharmaceuticals from the market.
A drug withdrawal is essentially a revocation of a drug’s approval, often based on discoveries of adverse
eﬀects after the drug has become marketed more widely than in clinical trials. Drug recalls occur when
179FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “An Inside Look at FDA On-Site,” posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-7.pdf.
180FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “An Inside Look at FDA On-Site,” posted at:
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-7.pdf.
52particular batches of a drug are unﬁt for marketing: perhaps they are mislabeled, or there was a defect in
the processing, for example. Drug recalls are not a revocation of the drug’s approval.
Prescription drug recalls spiked at 581 in 1991, but they gradually fell to 177 in 1998. Unfortunately, the
number rose to 352 again in 1999. Over the course of the decade, the number of recalls of over-the-counter
medication remained fairly stable, ranging from 34 in 1997 to 102 in 1994. See Figure 42.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Between 1995 and 1999, CDER withdrew four drugs from the market; from 1990 to 1994 it had only
withdrawn two. However, the increase in the total number of approvals means that the proportion of
withdrawals has increased only slightly.181 See Figure 43.
[ﬁgure redacted]
Staﬃng. One of the most valuable resources of FDA’s drugs program is its highly talented staﬀ. Approxi-
mately half of CDER’s employees are physicians or scientists.182 Since 1992, the staﬀ of the Center for Drug
Evalauation and Research has grown by 364 FTEs, many of which are now funded through industry-backed
user fees. This represents a 26 percent increase over 9 years. Field staﬀ have fared worse, losing 17 percent
of their staﬀ just since 1997.183 See Figure 44.
181Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Improving Public Health Through Human Drugs: CDER’s Annual Report to the
Nation 1999, at 27. Posted at: www.fda.gov/cder/reports/rtn99.pdf.
182Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, “From Test Tube to Patient: Improving Health through Human Drugs.” (1999
version), posted at: http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-1.pdf.
1831997 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 1999 Congressional Budget Request,FDA All Purpose Table–Total Program Level, posted
53[ﬁgure redacted]
Budget. User fee revenues have helped CDER respond to some of the more dire unmet needs in its division,
but the budget remains a serious problem for the agency. Inﬂation has eaten away most of CDER’s budget
increases over the past decade. For example, in the past ﬁve years, after accounting for inﬂation, the CDER
budget rose only ﬁve percent.184 See Figure 45.
Summary. The workload of FDA’s drug program increased substantially over the past decade—well beyond
the small increases in staﬀ and budget. While some indicators suggest that the program is becoming more
eﬃcient and eﬀective, citing shorter review periods and higher drug approval rates, others argue that those
results stem from an agency cutting corners as a response to severe political pressure and resource strains.185
Regardless, it is clear that the regulated markets are expanding rapidly, while the agency’s budget and
staﬃng levels have not kept up. If the trend persists, we risk the safety of our drug supply.
[ﬁgure redacted]
XII. ANALYSIS.
The foregoing examination of FDA’s responsibilities and its resources can lead to some basic generalizations
about hollow government. For example,
• The likelihood of hollow government is inversely related to the perceived importance of the
at: http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget99cj.htm.
2000 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 2001 Congressional Budget Request, FDA All Purpose Table–Total Program Level, posted at:
www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf
1841995 statistic: FDA Almanac Fiscal Year 1996, at 15. 2000 statistic: FDA Fiscal Year 2001 Congressional Budget Request,
FDA All Purpose Table–Total Program Level, posted at: www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2002/CJ2002/apt.pdf
185See, for example, the recent Pulitzer Prize winning feature: David Willman, “The New FDA: How a New Policy Led to
Seven Deadly Drugs.” Los Angeles Times (December 20, 2001), at A1.
54agency’s activities. As a nation, we want more services from the government than we are willing to pay
for. The federal budget cannot stretch far enough to ensure that every task that we demand of it will be
performed well, which guarantees that some degree of hollow government is inevitable. One of the important
tasks of policymakers, then, is to properly corral the hollowness in the areas of the government that will
result in the least harm.
Obviously, policymakers will be more vigilant about seeking out and ameliorating hollowness in agencies
whose activities are considered high public priorities. For example, the vast majority of the public would
consider ensuring the safety and eﬃcacy of human drugs much more important than guaranteeing the safety
and eﬃcacy of animal feed or drugs. Not surprisingly, the evidence of resource strain is starker in the Center
for Veterinary Medicine than in the Human Drugs Program.
• The political system establishes incentives for members of Congress and the President to
engage in some level of “hollowing.” Recall that Congress passed 24 new laws imposing responsibilities
on FDA during the 1980s, at a time when the agency’s staﬀ and budget were in a slump. Members of Congress
win the favor of the public by passing noble and sweeping legislation aimed at solving the societal problems
or responding to crises. It makes them look decisive, proactive, and energetic—characteristics voters love.
Yet Congress is not required to provide funding for new responsibilities that it heaps on agencies. Members
of Congress are rarely criticized for sponsoring or supporting legislation that provokes hollowing eﬀects.
After the legislation is enacted, the news story dies down for a long time. Years down the road, if anyone
ever investigates whether the statute is being adequately carried out or enforced, the agency will typically
be the target of criticism, not the member of Congress who voted to increase the jurisdiction of the agency.
• Decisions about FDA’s overall level of resources and the scope of its responsibilities are
made in a political process, which leads to diﬀerent outcomes than if they were made on other
55bases. This can result in hollowing. FDA appropriations and substantive laws result from a political
and legislative process that involves negotiations among people who have very diﬀerent priorities. That is not
to say that a political process is not a rational process—legislative bargains are highly calculated attempts to
optimally suit the expressed needs and desires of interest groups, the public, and the legislators themselves,
even if those needs and desires are based on incomplete information or are colored by crisis.
But the outcomes of a legislative process are not identical to those that would result if the process were
more fully based on science, medicine, economics, or management studies. A political process is particularly
prone to allocating disproportionate resources to programs and activities that respond to issues attracting
signiﬁcant public attention—even if those activities are not the ones that provide the most public good.
The legislative process, and in turn, resource allocation for agencies like FDA, is particularly aﬀected by the
loud cries of activists or the exigencies of a perceived crisis. After cyanide-laced Tylenol created a nationwide
panic, Congress passed legislation aimed at preventing such tampering. Even if the new law accomplished
much good, it was not adopted after a careful comparison of whether the resources it demanded could be
better put to use in other fashions. Thus, the very process by which resource allocations decisions are made
can lead to hollowing trends in government.
• Sometimes decisionmakers deliberately encourage hollow government in order to advance
other political goals. Killing government programs can be a very politically costly move. For instance,
Congress established the Council on Environmental Quality within the Executive Oﬃce of the President
in the late 1960s to respond to the public’s growing concern about the environment. This tiny oﬃce is
thought to duplicate some of the functions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
the Interior, so Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton have all tried unsuccessfully to eliminate it. Each
time the various Presidents targeted this seemingly insigniﬁcant oﬃce, they were attacked with a hail of
56criticism from environmental activists and were forced to back away.186
Because supporters of even the smallest government programs can often galvanize strong political opposition
to the elimination of the organization, politicians tend to avoid the trouble by starving an agency rather
than killing it. In many ways, this characterizes how President Reagan handled his opposition to many of
the regulatory burdens that the FDA placed on industry in the 1980s. Instead of pushing for the repeal of
laws or instructing his FDA Administrator to close some of the agency’s activities, which would have invited
criticism from consumer groups and some in the medical ﬁeld, the President slashed the budget and staﬀ of
the organization, ensuring that it could do less work.
Furthermore, after agencies have been starved for a period of time, their reputations suﬀer. They become
viewed as bumblers or inept managers because they are accomplishing so little. At that point, the lack of
results can make it even easier to persuade Congress to reduce the agency’s budget.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS.
In broad terms, it appears that FDA has experienced two diﬀerent varieties of hollowing during the past two
decades. During the Reagan administration, FDA, like many programs, was eyed for staﬀ reductions and
sharply limited budgets as a means of reducing the regulatory burden on American industry and restraining
the federal budget. The hollowing in this instance was intentional and calculated.
A somewhat diﬀerent form of hollowing took place in the 1990s. While budgetary pressures remained acute
for much of the decade, the national attitude toward government regulation seemed to soften slightly. Then,
186Ann Devroy, “Clinton Announces Plan to Replace Environmental Council,” The Washington Post (February 9, 1993), at
A6. Discusses attempts on the part of Clinton, Reagan, and Carter to eliminate the agency, which still exists. See oﬃce’s
website at: www.whitehouse.gov/ceq.
57the impetus for the hollowing appears to be the explosive growth of FDA-regulated industries rather than
an outright hostility towards regulation itself. As early as January 1998, then-Lead Deputy Commissioner
Michael A. Friedman stated that the agency’s workload was expanding at a rate of 12 percent per year—
which means that FDA’s responsibilities double every six years.187 Even though FDA has been spared
from much of the federal downsizing eﬀorts and its budget has grown by a respectable 50 percent over the
past decade, the increases are woefully inadequate to keep pace with ﬁelds expanding as quickly as biotech,
transgenic crop development, and AIDS research have, for example.
Even though the intentions of Congress and the administration may have been diﬀerent in the two decades,
the result has been nearly the same: an agency whose mission exceeds its capacity.
James Benson, FDA’s Acting Commissioner in 1990, aptly summed up the erosion his organization was
experiencing and the toll on its work:
[P]eople expect more than we are capable of delivering. Paradoxically, we live in an age
when people want less government, have less respect for Federal workers, yet, at the same
time, demand more and better protection from the risks of everyday life.... At the heart of
this issue is whether we’ve been able to keep pace with a rising tide of demands. The simple
answer is “no.”188
FDA is one of the most important regulatory agencies in the country. It has always served as a staunch line
of defense guarding the American public from public health catastrophes and consumer fraud. Despite a few
isolated incidents of scandal, FDA has earned a reputation for careful, impartial, and highly-esteemed work.
187“FDA Faces Performance Challenges: Friedman Cites Resource Constraints.” The Pike: a publication of the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research, (January 15, 1998), at 1.
58As a result, the United States enjoys the safest food and drug supply in the world.
But the evidence is clear that the agency cannot continue to oﬀer the same quality of protection with its
resources under such severe strain. Although nominal attempts were made to shield FDA from some of the
budget cutbacks of the 1990s, the gulf separating its capacity and its responsibilities expanded as the volume
and complexity of almost all of FDA’s regulated markets grew oﬀ the charts over the past ten years. Unless
Congress and the President can devise a way to direct more resources (whether public or private) to FDA,
the agency’s long-term health is in jeopardy.
We have seen the results of hollow government in other governmental arenas: billions lost to fraud in the
Medicare program and the savings and loan scandals, environmental disasters like the Exxon Valdez incident,
and elderly citizens losing their Social Security beneﬁts because of unreliable intermediaries at the Social
Security Administration. Even these disasters pale in comparison to the catastrophe that could ensue if the
Food and Drug Administration is allowed to continue its present trend of decay.
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